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Article 2

How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore?
Erwin Chemerinsky
"Honk if you've heard enough about Bush v. Gore"-that's how
Larry Tribe begins his comment in the November 2001 Harvard Law
Review about the case.1 It would be an understandable reaction at this
point. Over a dozen books and dozens of law review articles about the
case have already been published, with more coming out each week.
Last spring, I declined some invitations to participate in symposia on
Bush v. Gore2 for fear that I had little left to say about the case. Yet
now, a year-and-a-half after the decision, seems an important time to be
discussing the decision. Largely this is because of the wonderful
presenters at this symposium, but also because now it seems, with even
a relatively short period of time for reflection, there is still so much to
discuss.
Ironically, the huge amount of literature on Bush v. Gore is itself a
reason for further discussion, sorting out what is insightful and helpful
from what is not.3 Also, we are now seeing the first wave of lawsuits
based on Bush v. Gore.4 More profoundly, Bush v. Gore, as much as

*

Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science,

University of Southern California Law School. I want to thank Jennifer Fescovich for her
excellent research assistance.
1. Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore From its Hall of
Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 172 (2001).
2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
3. See, e.g., BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY (E.J. Dionne, Jr. &
William Kristol eds., 2001); CORRESPONDENTS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, 36 DAYS: THE
COMPLETE CHRONICLE OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS (2001); ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001);
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: How THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001); RICHARD POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001).
4. See, e.g., Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding no "expressly
declared constitutional right to vote for electors in presidential elections," based on Bush v.
Gore); Walker v. Exeter Region Coop. Sch. Dist., 157 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 n.6 (D.N.H. 2001)
(rejecting challenges based on Bush v. Gore); Kevin Sack, Counting Every Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2001, § 4, at 5, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File (reporting
that lawsuits based on Bush v. Gore have been filed in several states).
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any Supreme Court case, forces us to think about the role of the courts
and the relationship between law and politics in adjudication.
The events of September 11, 2001, increased, not lessened, the
importance of Bush v. Gore. Before September 11, George W. Bush
would have been remembered as the first President chosen by the
Supreme Court. But after September 11, he likely will be remembered
and evaluated for how he responded to the attacks. Yet, the importance
of the presidency at this time magnifies the importance of that case. I
doubt that I was the only one on the morning of September 11 to think
of George W. Bush being the President and how he got there. I doubt
that I was the only one who in seeing John Ashcroft as Attorney
General thinks back to Bush v. Gore.
What I want to discuss, as the keynote to this terrific symposium, is
how should we think about Bush v. Gore. I want to suggest that some
ways that have been offered are not very helpful. I also want to suggest
other ways that are potentially important, yet have not been adequately
pursued. Thus, this paper will have two parts. First, what are ways of
looking at Bush v. Gore that don't seem very useful? 5 Second, what are
some ways of 6examining the decision that have not been adequately
pursued so far?
At the outset, I need to offer a disclaimer. There is no neutral or
objective view of Bush v. Gore, and I do not purport to have one. I
voted for Al Gore. Perhaps more importantly, I did volunteer legal
work for Al Gore in November and December of 2000. I went to
Florida to argue the so-called "butterfly ballot" case in Florida trial
court. 7 At the request of the Gore legal team, I often drafted sections of
briefs during the ensuing litigation. It certainly means that I cannot
claim to be a neutral observer, but I also think that no one can.

I.

NOT VERY HELPFUL WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT BUSH V. GORE

I want to begin by identifying some ways of looking at Bush v. Gore
that have been advanced and do not seem very helpful or useful in
understanding the decision. Considering why they are not helpful offers
some possibly important insights.

5. See infra Part I (discussing why certain interpretations of Bush v. Gore have not been
helpful in understanding its holding).
6. See infra Part Hl(considering five relatively less popular issues in Bush v. Gore).
7. See Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam).
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A. The Claim that Bush v. Gore Will Undermine the Legitimacy of the
Supreme Court
Immediately after the decision, one of the most frequent questions I
was asked by reporters was whether the ruling would irreparably
damage the credibility of the Supreme Court. Certainly, many people
on December 12, 2000, and the days following it expressed this
concern. Justice Stevens eloquently expressed this fear in his dissent in
Bush v. Gore:
The endorsement of [the majority's position] can only lend credence
to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the
land.... Although we may never know with complete certainty the
identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity
of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's
confidence in the
8
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.
Yet, this loss of confidence has not manifested itself. According to
Gallup polls, 65% of Americans expressed confidence in the Court as
an institution in September 2000 and 62% expressed confidence in June
2001. 9 Why has there not been the loss in legitimacy that so many
predicted on December 12? There are many possible explanations,
none mutually exclusive.
One explanation is that Bush v. Gore enhanced the Republican's view
of the Court and lessened the Democrat's perception of the Court, so it
evened out. Again, the Gallup polls provided some support for this.
According to them, approval of the Court among Republicans went
from 60% in August 2000 to 70% after the decision in December, while
approval among Democrats shrunk from 70% in August to 42% in
December. 10
Second, any harm to the Court's credibility was likely short-lived.
The country quickly accepted that George W. Bush was President, no
matter how he got there, and moved on. This acceptance was true even
before September 11. Certainly, as the nation's focus shifted, Bush v.
Gore faded in significance.
Third, in such a close election, most people were willing to accept
any result. The margin of statistical error was larger than the number of
votes that decided the election. Most people understood that our system

8. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Hispanics, Whites Rate Bush Positively, While Blacks Are Much
More Negative, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, June 21, 2001.
10. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Has Become More Politicized,
GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2001.
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of voting and counting votes was simply not precise enough to
definitively resolve such a close election.
Fourth, people accepted that the Court made political choices. Those
who suggested that the Court's legitimacy would be permanently
harmed based this on the assumption that people would be shocked by
the seemingly partisan split of the Court in Bush v. Gore. But after
decades of high profile cases, ranging from Brown v. Board of
Education11 to Miranda v. Arizona 12 to current cases involving school
prayer, 13 people have realized that the Court makes value choices in
deciding the meaning of the Constitution. The rejection of Robert Bork
for the Supreme Court in 1987, for example, was all about recognition
of the role
of an individual Justice's ideology in constitutional decision14
making.
Finally, and most profoundly, the Supreme Court's legitimacy is not
fragile. Claims about the Supreme Court having fragile legitimacy have
been very important in American constitutional law. Justice Felix
Frankfurter based his jurisprudence around it; recall his dissent in Baker
v. Carr,15 in which he opposed the Court's involvement in
reapportionment because of fear that it would undermine the Court's
legitimacy. 16 Scholars such as Alexander Bickel and, more recently,
Jesse Choper, have built theories of judicial review around the premise
that the Court must conserve its limited public legitimacy. 17 But Bush
v. Gore requires that we rethink what is even meant by the Court's
legitimacy. Is it approval ratings in Gallup polls? Is it something
deeper and less susceptible to measurement? However defined, Bush v.
Gore indicates that the Supreme Court's legitimacy is robust, not

11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution Is Not 'Hard Law': The Bork Rejection
and the Future of Constitutional Jurisprudence, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 29, 31 (1989)
(emphasizing new role of ideology in proceedings); see also MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF
PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S
NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992) (discussing how the defeat of Robert Bork's

nomination to the Supreme Court in 1990 was a rejection of Bork's conservative ideology,
particularly his narrow vision of the meaning of personal liberty under the Constitution);
NORMAN VIEIRA, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE BORK AND THE POLITICIZATION OF
SENATE CONFIRMATIONS (1998) (analyzing the Bork proceedings and the impact of judicial

ideology in the confirmation process).
15. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. Id. at 267-68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
17. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); JESSE CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION
OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
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fragile, and no single decision is likely to make much difference in the
public's appraisal of the Court. The credibility of the Court is the
product of over 200 years of American history; it is the result of
confidence in the Court's methods and overall decisions. It reflects
popular understanding of the desirability of resolving disputed questions
in the courts and under the Constitution, even though it means that
everyone knows that, at times, they will be on the losing side.
B. Bush v. Gore Was a Corrupt Decision
Some have suggested that Bush v. Gore was a baldly partisan choice
by Republican Justices to make the Republican candidate the next
President. Vincent Bugliosi and Alan Dershowitz have advanced this
view. 18 Indeed, Bugliosi argued that the Justices in the majority should
be subjected to impeachment proceedings.
As is often true, a political cartoon expressed this partisanship well.
On Friday, December 15, 2000, a cartoon by Paul Conrad in the Los
Angeles Times depicted nine Justices behind the bench, with five
holding "Bush for President" signs and four with "Gore for President"
signs. The caption on the cartoon stated,
"Why the Supreme Court does
' 19
not want cameras in the courtroom."
But I believe that the role of politics was more subtle and more
profound. On Friday, December 8, after the Florida Supreme Court
ordered the counting of uncounted votes, everyone I knew who voted
for Gore praised the decision, and everyone I knew who voted for Bush
decried the ruling. I immediately said that there was no reason to think
that the Justices on the Supreme Court would be any different.
Look at the scholarly literature on Bush v. Gore. Democrats and
liberals, like Larry Tribe, Alan Dershowitz, and Ronald Dworkin
criticize the decision.
In contrast, Republicans and conservatives,
such as Richard Posner, Nelson Lund, and Doug Kmiec all praise the
ruling. 2 1 Is this just coincidence? Imagine that the results in Florida
and the nation had been reversed, and it was Gore who was slightly
18. VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT 1 (2001); DERSHOWITZ, supra

note 3, at 5.
19. Paul Conrad, Cartoon, Why the Supreme Court Does Not Want Cameras in the
Courtroom, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at B9.
20.

See A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002); DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 41; Tribe,
supra note 1, at 173.
21. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 1; Nelson Lund, The UnbearableRightness of Bush v. Gore,
23 CARDOzO L. REv. 1219, 1219 (2002); Douglas Kmiec, The Court's Decision Is Law, Not
Politics, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at B 11,availableat 2000 WL 25927382.
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ahead in the popular vote in Florida and would have a majority in the
Electoral College by winning Florida. If the tables were turned, and it
was Bush who was urging the counting of uncounted votes, would
anyone really believe that the sides, on the Court or among academics,
would be the same?
In fact, it would have been much easier for the dissenting Justices on
the Court and liberal law professors to embrace the equal protection
argument. 22 Part of the irony of Bush v. Gore is that it was virtually the
only case in which Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas found an equal
protection violation, except in striking down affirmative action
programs.
In other words, it was not that the five Justices in the majority set out
to make sure that Bush became President, and the four dissenters acted
to make sure that Gore was President. I truly believe that each of the
nine Justices deeply believed that he or she was making a ruling on the
law, not on partisan grounds. But how each saw the case was entirely a
product of the Justices' biases and views.
This decision has profound implications for how we think about the
law. First, we are all result-oriented, consciously or unconsciously,
much of the time. We come to conclusions and then look for arguments
to support them. We constantly hear criticisms of judges or academics
for being result-oriented. Yet, there is no way to avoid this. The
premises we begin with influence, if not determine, the conclusions we
come to. Bush v. Gore unquestionably seemed a result-oriented
decision in the sense that the nine Justices each came to a result that was
consistent with their political views, so far as we know them. That does
not mean that it was corrupt or even unique among judicial decisions.
In the vast majority of important cases, the Justices' conclusions were a
reflection of the views with which they started.
Second, because of this decision, the identity of the judges is allimportant. If the Supreme Court had one more Justice appointed by a
Democratic President, and one less appointed by a Republican, Al Gore
would be President today. If Robert Bork had been confirmed as a
Supreme Court Justice, rather than his replacement nominee Anthony
Kennedy, Roe v. Wade23 would have been overruled. In recent months,
some Republicans seeking to gain approval of President Bush's
nominees for the federal bench have argued that ideology should not be
considered in the judicial confirmation process. This argument is
22. The core of the per curiam's argument was that counting uncounted votes without preset
standards violates equal protection.
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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nonsense. The identity and views of the judges are all-important in
determining their decisions. Bush v. Gore powerfully demonstrates this
point. Presidents, including Bush, always select with an eye on
ideology. The Senate must look to ideology as well in deciding who is
acceptable for a lifetime federal judgeship.
C. The Court Needed to Act to Prevent a Crisis
Some, such as Judge Richard Posner and Professor John Yoo, have
argued that Bush v. Gore was justified, even though its reasoning was
flawed, to prevent a national crisis. 24 This is an ends justifies the means
claim: the goal of preventing a political crisis was sufficiently important
as to warrant a decision that was wrong as a matter of constitutional
doctrine.
This argument is flawed both factually and normatively. Factually, it
is wrong to say that a serious crisis would have occurred if the Supreme
Court had denied review or upheld the Florida Supreme Court. If the
Supreme Court had not stopped the counting on Saturday, December 9,
the additional counting was to be completed by the end of Sunday,
December 10. 25 There were two possibilities at that point: Bush would
have remained ahead or Gore would have gone in the lead in Florida.
No one can know which possibility would have occurred since the
media's tabulation of the ballots after the election showed that Bush
would have been ahead under the Gore approach to counting ballots, but
Gore would have won Florida under the Bush approach. 26
If Bush had remained ahead in Florida, there obviously would have
been no constitutional crisis. Bush would have carried Florida, won in
the Electoral College, and no one would have objected.
If Gore was ahead in Florida, it would have been more complicated,
but still not a crisis because federal laws provide a basis for resolving
disputes. 27 In all likelihood, the Governor of Florida, Jeb Bush, would
not have changed the ascertainment that he filed in the Electoral College
certifying that his brother carried Florida. It also is possible that the
24. POSNER, supra note 3, at 188-89; John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 790 (2001). For an excellent criticism of Posner's analysis, see H. Jefferson
Powell, Overcoming Democracy: Richard Posner and Bush v. Gore, 17 J.L. & POL. 333, 352
(2001).
25. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, Who Won Florida? The Answer Emerges, but Surely Not the
Final Word, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A16, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New
York Times File; Recount Would Have Increased Bush Win, Papers Say, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2001, at AI0, available at 2001 WL 2475429.
27. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000).
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Republican-controlled Florida legislature would have passed a
resolution awarding the Florida electors to Bush. But the Florida
Supreme Court might well have declared that Gore carried the state
based on the results of the recount that occurred pursuant to its order.
That would have meant two sets of electors from Florida, one for
Bush and one for Gore. This situation has happened before, such as in
1960 when Hawaii designated two sets of electors, one for John F.
Kennedy and one for Richard M. Nixon. 2 8 Federal law provides that if
there are two sets of electors from a state, Congress decides which
represents the state so long as both the House of Representatives and the
Senate agree. 29 Such agreement was highly unlikely here. The House,
which was controlled by Republicans, surely would have voted in favor
of the Bush electors. But the new Senate that would have considered
30
this was split evenly, 50/50, between Democrats and Republicans.
Under Senate rules, the Vice President breaks a tie.3 1 There, of course,
is no doubt for whom Al Gore would have voted.
Federal law provides that if the House and the Senate disagree about
32
which electors to recognize, the governor of the state decides.
Obviously, is there is no question as to which set of electors Jeb Bush
would have chosen to represent Florida.
All of this would have been resolved by early January 2001, well in
advance of January 20, the prescribed date for the inauguration of the
new President. 33 Certainly, it would have been dramatic and even
entertaining to watch. But a crisis that risked paralyzing the country?
No serious risk of that existed. It certainly is possible to hypothesize
legal issues that could have arisen along the way. What if the Florida
Supreme Court ordered Governor Jeb Bush to change Florida's
ascertainment in the Electoral College and he refused? But any legal
issues could have been resolved as they arose and courts could have
prevented a crisis then, rather than acting to forestall a feared crisis that
was very unlikely to ever develop.
Normatively, the crisis argument is even more problematic. What
exactly is meant by a "constitutional crisis"? Who decides if one
28. Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J.
1407, 1421 n.55 (2001).
29. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
30. Lizette Alvarez, Feminine Mystique Grows in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at A30,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File (reporting that the Senate split
50/50).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
32. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (2000).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
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exists? What powers does this bestow on the courts? During the 1990s,
the federal government literally shut down because of a budget impasse
between the White House and Congress. 34 Would this justify the
federal courts stepping in and arbitrarily awarding additional budget
power to one side or the other? No one made such a claim even when
the federal government was closed for days for lack of funds. During
the 1960s and 1970s, the executive branch waged an unpopular war
without a formal declaration of war. Suits were brought to halt it as
unconstitutional.3 5 Was this a crisis that justified judicial intervention
to stop an unconstitutional war that was costing thousands of lives and
billions of dollars? The Supreme Court never thought so.
Those who advance the "crisis hypothesis" never explain why
averting a crisis justifies changing the usual constitutional rules and
doctrines. It is a frightening proposition because the government can
easily claim that a variety of crises exist-fighting the war on terrorism,
the war on drugs, stopping communism-and claim that each warrants
actions that would otherwise be unconstitutional.
Ignoring the
Constitution in times of crisis goes against the very core of why there is
a Constitution: to make sure that in difficult times core values and
commitments are not sacrificed.

II.

SOME ADDITIONAL AREAS TO EXPLORE IN THINKING ABOUT
BUSH V. GORE

A great deal has been written about the two main constitutional issues
considered by the Supreme Court: whether counting uncounted votes in
Florida would have denied equal protection and whether it violated
Article II of the Constitution and federal statutes to continue the
counting. I have little to add to what has already been said about these
two issues. 3 6 Instead, I want to identify five issues that I believe have
received inadequate attention so far.

34. Francis Clines, Act 11 of Federal Shutdown: Some See Politics of the Absurd, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1995, § 1, at 1, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File (reporting
on the effect of the second government shutdown).
35. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesigner, 484 F.2d 1307, 1312-13, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973)
(reversing the lower court's decision granting declaratory and injunctive relief against the
continuation of bombing and other military activities in Cambodia because the challenge
presented a nonjusticiable political question), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Orlando v. Laird,
443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.) (rejecting such challenges as presenting nonjusticiable political
questions), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
36. A particularly insightful analysis of the equal protection issue is found in Tribe, supra note
1, at 217. A particularly insightful analysis of the Article 11issue is found in GILLMAN, supra
note 3, at 159.
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Was a Remedy Possiblefor the Illegal Butterfly Ballots?

The ballot in Palm Beach County was constructed in a misleading
manner: the hole next to Gore's name was actually a vote for Patrick

Buchanan. This resulted in approximately 4000 Palm Beach County
voters mistakenly casting their votes for Buchanan, though intended for
Gore. 3 7 This, of course, was far more than the margin of Bush's victory

and more than enough to have made Gore the clear winner in Florida.
When I went to Palm Beach County in late November 2000, I heard
many voters complain that they discovered immediately after they voted
that they had made a mistake and asked for a new ballot, but were

refused.
A lawsuit seeking a new election in Palm Beach County was
immediately filed in Florida. The Florida trial court dismissed that case,
and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.3 8 The Florida
courts did not deny that the Palm Beach County butterfly ballot was
illegally designed and that this likely decided the election; rather, they
39
said that there was nothing the courts could do about this problem.
40
Commentators have accepted this conclusion with little analysis.
But is it right that there is really nothing that a court could have done
as a remedy? Doesn't Marbury v. Madison say that a basic principle of
law is that when there is a right, there must be a remedy 4 1 Indeed,
many Supreme Court decisions articulate this rule. 42 The obvious
remedy here would have been for the Florida courts to order a new
election in Palm Beach County with a properly constructed ballot. Only
those who voted on November 7 would be allowed to vote in the new
election. There were precedents in Florida law, as well as in other
states, for ordering a new election as4a3 remedy for serious violations that
could not be cured in any other way.

37. John Allen Paulos, We're Measuring Bacteria with a Yardstick, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
2000, at A27, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
38. Gore v. Hams, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1259-62 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
39. Id. at 1260-61 (per curiam).
40. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 1, at 205-06.
41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
42. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank
v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades v. Anderson, 401 So. 2d 824 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a new ratification election was required when a union was guilty of
unfair labor practices during a collective bargaining agreement ratification election); Nelson v.
Robinson, 301 So. 2d 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that an election is valid unless
ballot defects clearly operate to prevent free, fair, and open choice, which is not determined by
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The Florida trial court rejected this possibility, concluding that the
Constitution requires a uniform day for choosing electors and that
44
allowing a new election would violate this constitutional provision.
But this provision is not about Election Day, November 7; it is about the
day that electors are chosen by each state, December 18, 2000, under
federal law. 4 5 The trial court erred in reading this constitutional
provision as a bar to a new election. In fact, it is possible to imagine
other situations in which elections could be held after November 7. For
instance, imagine a hurricane in Florida on Presidential Election Day
that prevented the polls from opening or an earthquake in California
with the same effect. The Florida trial court's analysis would have
meant that those in areas where the polls did not open would have been
completely denied the right to vote. That cannot be right; surely a
different election day would have been designated. A recent example of
this occurring was in New York City on September 11, 2001. The City
Charter mandated that as Election Day, and the polls opened as
scheduled. 46 But the tragedy that occurred
early that day caused the
47
election to be postponed until a later date.
This example is not meant to minimize the practical problems with
holding a new election in Palm Beach County. How would all who
voted, especially those who cast absentee ballots, be contacted and
notified of the new election? Wouldn't the knowledge that they were
deciding the presidential election likely have caused many to change
their votes, such as Nader voters switching to Gore or Buchanan voters
shifting to Bush? Should this likelihood have mattered? The new Palm
Beach County election would have created a media circus, with all eyes
focusing on what occurred there.
My point is simply that there has not been sufficient attention to what
should have occurred in light of the illegal ballot in Palm Beach County
and the effect that it had on the outcome of the election.

placement of the name on a ballot); State ex rel. Olson v. Bakken, 329 N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1983)
(holding that a special election is proper where the voters of votes not counted due to mis-labeling
of ballots in a precinct can be identified and those votes recast).
44. McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 17, 2000) (unpublished order
denying a new election).
45. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
46. Adam Nagourney, Primary Rescheduled for Sept. 25, With Runoff, if Necessary, Set for
Oct. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A2, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York
Times Files.
47. Id.
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B. Should the Court Have Stayed the Counting on December 9?
On December 8, after the Florida Supreme Court handed down its
decision, I repeatedly said in media interviews that the key was to watch
whether the Supreme Court stayed the counting in Florida. If the
counting occurred, and Bush was ahead, then the Court would have had
no need to hold oral arguments or decide the case. But if the counting
proceeded, and Gore was ahead, then it would have been far more
difficult for the Supreme Court to have awarded the election to Bush.
On Saturday morning, December 9, I was watching the television
broadcast of C-Span showing the counting in Florida. I kept waiting to
see if the Supreme Court would intervene. Of course, the Court did and
by a 5-4 vote stayed the counting of the ballots in Florida. 4 8 At that
point, I believed that the result was preordained: the Supreme Court
would reverse the Florida Supreme Court and effectively award the
election to Bush.
Because of the decision on December 12, there has been far less
attention to the Court's order on December 9. Yet, there is an important
legal issue here: Was the Court correct in holding that the requirements
for a stay were met? A stay from the Supreme Court requires 49a
demonstration that irreparable injury would occur without a stay.
Gore's lawyer, David Boies, is described as having been in a
Washington restaurant at the time the stay was announced and
50
screaming out, "What is the irreparable harm?"
What indeed? The Supreme Court issued no opinion justifying the
stay. But Justice Antonin Scalia, writing only for himself, issued an
opinion on December 9 explaining the stay. 5 1 He said that Bush met the
requirements for a stay: showing a substantial likelihood of prevailing
on the merits and irreparable injury. 52 Justice Scalia identified two
injuries. First, Justice Scalia said that counting the uncounted votes
risked placing a cloud over the legitimacy of a Bush presidency. 53 In
other words, if the counting put Gore ahead, but the Supreme Court
disallowed it, there would be doubts about the legitimacy of Bush's
presidency. But such speculation as to political fallout hardly seems to
meet the legal requirement for "irreparable injury." Maybe that would

48. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (per curiam) [hereinafter Bush 1].
49. Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. David Firestone, Supreme Court, Split 5-4, Halts Florida Count in Blow to Gore, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, § 1, at 1, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
51. Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 1046-47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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have put a cloud over the Bush presidency, or maybe people would have
just accepted him as President anyway. The reality is that the Supreme
Court's halting the counting also put a cloud over the Bush presidency.
For those who voted for Gore on November 7, there always will be a
cloud over the Bush presidency; for those who voted for Bush, they
always will be thrilled that their candidate won. It is hard to turn this
into irreparable injury.
Second, Justice Scalia said that counting the ballots would cause
54
them to degrade, and thus prevent, a more accurate count later on.
The problem with this argument is that there was nothing in the record
to support Scalia's assertion about degradation of ballots. He just made
it up. Moreover, it was a disingenuous concern: the Court prevented
counting so as to protect a more accurate later counting that it prevented
from occurring.
Is there any way to justify the Court's order stopping the counting on
December 9? Shouldn't the counting have continued, even though the
Supreme Court was going to hear the matter on December 11 ?
C. Should the CourtHave Decided Bush v. Gore?
Was Bush v. Gore justiciable when the Court decided it on December
12? The Supreme Court did not address this issue, perhaps because it
was not raised in the briefs. But justiciability is jurisdictional and courts
55
are required to raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte.
56
There are serious reasons to doubt the justiciability of Bush v. Gore.
For several reasons, the issues before the Supreme Court in Bush v.
Gore were not ripe for review. The central issue was whether the
counting of votes would deny equal protection. 57 There would be a
constitutional violation only if similar ballots were treated differently in
the counting process. 5 8 But it could not be known if this would occur
until the counting occurred and the trial judge in Florida, Judge Lewis,
ruled on all of the challenges. Until then, it was purely speculative as to
whether there would be a problem with similar ballots being treated
differently.
The Supreme Court, in its per curiam opinion, focused on inequalities
that already had occurred. The per curiam opinion points to differences
54. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
55. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1998).
56. I develop this argument more fully in Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not
Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093, 1098 (2001).
57. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam) [hereinafter Bush I1].
58. Id. at 105-06 (per curiam).
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in the Miami-Dade County and the Palm Beach County counting." But
the counting that already had been done was not the issue before the
The only issue was whether the counting should
Supreme Court.
6
1
continue.
The prior experience was not predictive of what was to
occur because of a key change: a single judge was overseeing the
counting under the Florida Supreme Court's decision. 62 This judge was
could eliminate any
to hear all of the disputes and potentially
63
standard.
uniform
a
applying
by
inequalities
Justice Stevens emphasized exactly this point in his dissent. He
wrote: "Admittedly, the use of differing substandards for determining
voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may
Those concerns are alleviated-if not
raise serious concerns.
eliminated-by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately
adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process." 6 4 Justice
Stevens, however, did not draw a key conclusion from his observation:
the challenge to the counting was not ripe for review. Only after the
counting was completed could the parties claim that there was
inequality and thus a constitutional violation.
Phrased another way, the Supreme Court improperly treated an "as
applied" equal protection challenge as if it were a facial challenge.
Bush was not arguing that the Florida election law was unconstitutional
on its face. Neither in the briefs nor in the oral argument did Bush's
lawyers suggest such a facial attack. Rather, Bush argued that counting
without uniform standards denied equal protection. 65 This would be an
equal protection violation only if, after the counting and the resolution
of disputes by the judge, similar ballots were treated differently. But
that could not possibly be known until all the ballots were counted.
59. Id. at 106-08 (per curiam).
60. At one point, the per curiam opinion argues that the past inequalities were relevant. The
Court stated: "That brings the analysis to yet a further equal protection problem. The votes
certified by the court included a partial total from one county, Miami-Dade. The Florida Supreme
Court's decision thus gives no assurance that the recounts included in the final certification must
be complete." Id. at 108 (per curiam). But even the Supreme Court's phrasing acknowledges that
it was speculative as to whether there would be incompleteness by the time the counting was
finished. The existence and extent of this incompleteness could not be known when the Supreme
Court decided the case on December 12 precisely because the Court had stayed the counting
process.
61. Id. at 110 (per curiam).
62. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'dper curiamsub nom. Bush
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
/H,
63. Id. (per curiam).
dissenting).
64. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J.,
65. Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 20-23, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70
(2000) (No. 00-836), LEXIS 2000 U.S. Briefs 836.
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Until then, it would be purely speculative as to whether there would be
a denial of equal protection.
Bush v. Gore was not ripe for an even more basic reason: George W.
Bush might well have ended up ahead after the counting. In that event,
there obviously would have been no need for the Supreme Court to
decide his appeal. The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a case is
not ripe when it is unknown whether the injury will be suffered.6 6
Bush v. Gore was not ripe for review on December 9, when the stay
was issued, or December 11, when the case was heard, or December 12,
when the case was decided. The case would have been ripe only after
all the counting was done if: a) Gore came out ahead in Florida, and b)
Bush could present evidence of inequalities in how the ballots were
actually counted. Until and unless these eventualities occurred, the case
was not ripe and should have been dismissed.
Also, it can be questioned whether the Supreme Court should have
found Bush v. Gore not justiciable as a political question. The most
famous defense of the political question doctrine was made by the late
Professor Alexander Bickel. 67 Professor Bickel wrote:
Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the politicalquestion doctrine: the Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded
in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability
to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which
tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that
the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will
not be; (d) finally ("in a mature democracy"), the inner vulnerability,
the self-doubt of an institution which
is electorally irresponsible and
68
has no earth to draw strength from.
Although Bickel wrote these words almost four decades ago, they
seem almost prescient when applied to Bush v. Gore. Certainly in terms
of (a), there is "strangeness of the issue" and its intractability to a
principled resolution. Never before in history had the Supreme Court
decided a presidential election. The Court said that counting the ballots

66. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974) (holding that complaint failed
to satisfy the threshold requirement of alleging an actual case or controversy, in that none of the
plaintiffs were identified as having suffered any injury); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
148 (1967) (explaining that the basic rationale of requiring ripeness is "to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements").
67. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term; Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 46 (1961); see also BICKEL, supra note 17, at 183 ("The culmination of
any progression of devices for withholding the ultimate constitutional judgment of the Supreme
Court-and in a sense their sum-is the doctrine of political questions.").
68. BICKEL, supra note 17, at 184.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

without uniform standards would be unequal, 69 but no prior decision
ever had found variations among counties in election practices to be
unconstitutional. Nor did the Court explain why this inequality was
impermissible while many others in Florida, such as differences in
voting machines, in ballots, and in treatment of minority voters, were
constitutional.
Indeed, the Court seemed aware of the problems with applying equal
protection to such variances among counties and with opening the door
to challenges to virtually every election because of reliance on local
election officials. The per curiam opinion said: "Our consideration is
limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection
in election processes generally presents many complexities." 70 This
certainly confirms Professor Bickel's concerns about the strangeness of
the issue and the lack of principles for resolution of it.
Professor Bickel's second factor, (b), is even more relevant: "the
sheer momentousness of [the issue], which tends to unbalance judicial
judgment." 7 1 If any case fits this description, it surely is Bush v. Gore.
Professor Bickel's latter two criteria, (c) and (d), point to a concern
over what issues should be decided by unelected judges. Bickel's
concern was how involvement in some political issues could
compromise the legitimacy of the Court. 72 Although I am critical of
Bickel's view and of many of the uses of the political question
doctrine, 73 Bush v. Gore obviously cost the Supreme Court enormously
in terms of its credibility. Over forty-nine million people voted for Al
Gore and undoubtedly virtually all of them regard the Court's decision
as a partisan ruling by a Republican majority in favor of the Republican
candidate. Few cases, if any, in American history have been more
widely perceived as partisan than Bush v. Gore. My point here is not to
undertake a thorough analysis of the political question doctrine issueor of justiciability-but rather, to indicate that this is a serious question
that has not received sufficient attention.

69. Bush 1H,531 U.S. at 104-05 (per curiam).
70. Id. at 109 (per curiam).
71. BICKEL, supra note 17, at 184.
72. Id. at 193-98.
73. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 98-102 (1987).
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D. What Are the Implications of the Court's Equal Protection
Analysis?
The per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore held that counting the
uncounted votes without legal standards violated equal protection. 74 In
other words, the Supreme Court said that significant variations within a
state in a presidential election deny equal protection. But this has
profound implications for the conduct of elections in the United States.
By this reasoning, the entire election in Florida denied equal protection
and was unconstitutional. There were major differences in Florida
among counties in how the ballots were designed, how absentee ballots
were handled, how minority voters were treated at the polls, and what
types of voting machines were used. By the Court's reasoning all of
these variations violated equal protection.
These intra-state differences, of course, were not limited to Florida.
In every state except Oklahoma, county officials have significant
discretion with regard to aspects of conducting elections. 76 Does this
mean that all of these elections are unconstitutional?
The Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore tried to duck these implications
by declaring, "Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances,
for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities. " 7 7 In other words, the Court said that it
was deciding the issue only for this case and only for this day.
But that, of course, is not how the legal system operates. Decisions
do create precedents, and litigants undoubtedly will base lawsuits on the
reasoning of Bush v. Gore. Immediately after September 11, I asked
Mark Rosenbaum, the Legal Director of the Southern California
American Civil Liberties Union, whether he planned to bring a suit
based on Bush v. Gore. He said yes, but he was going to ask his
assistant to go through the Los Angeles phone book to find people
named Bush to be the plaintiffs; he said that he thought the Supreme
Court's decision only might have precedential effect with a plaintiff
named Bush. The Southern California ACLU did file suit challenging
74. Bush H, 531 U.S. at 110 (per curiam).
75. See, e.g., David Gonzalez, Blacks, Citing Flaws, Seek Inquiry Into Florida Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11,2000, at A13, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File
(expressing charges of minority vote suppression); Kevin Sack, In Desperate Florida Fight,
Gore's Hard Strategic Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at Al, available at LEXIS, News
Library, The New York Times File (examining the disparities in ballots and voting machines
used).
76.
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the differences in voting machines used among counties in California,
78
with varying degrees of accuracy.
Lawsuits have been filed across the
79
country based on Bush v. Gore.
The key question is which intra-state variations violate equal
protection. The core basis for the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore was
that voting is a fundamental right under equal protection. This, of
course, is not new. Challenges to intra-state differences might have
been brought even without Bush v. Gore. But the case certainly has
brought this issue to everyone's attention: which variations violate equal
protection? This is the crucial question for courts and scholars to
consider in the months and years ahead.
E. What Are the Implicationsof Bush v. Gore for Federalism?
In analyzing Bush v. Gore, one of the most important areas to
consider is its treatment of federalism. The supreme irony of the case is
that the majority was comprised of five Justices who are revolutionizing
constitutional law through their commitment to federalism and states'
rights, but here showed no deference whatsoever to the state court.
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion made two arguments. First,
counting the uncounted votes without standards violates equal
protection. 80
Second, Florida law prevented the counting from
continuing past December 12.81 This second point is indispensable to
the Court's decision to end the counting. Assuming that there were
inequalities in the counting that violated the Constitution, there were
two ways to remedy this situation: count none of the uncounted ballots
or count all of the ballots with uniform standards. The latter would
involve remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court for
development of standards and for such relief as that court deemed
appropriate.
It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court did not hold that
federal law prevented the counting from continuing. The only reason
for not remanding the case-for which Justices Souter and Breyer
argued 82-was the Court's judgment that Florida law prevented this. In
two paragraphs near the end of the per curiam opinion, the Court
explained why it was stopping the counting:
78.

Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-03470-SVW(RZ), 2002 WL 1766410 (C.D. Cal. May 9,

2002).
79.

B.J. Palermo, 'Bush v. Gore' Prompts Voter-Access Suits by Civil Rights Group, NAT'L

L.J., May 11, 2001, at Al.
80. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 103 (per curiam).
81. Id. at 110-11 (per curiam).
82. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended
the State's electors to "participat[e] fully in the federal electoral
process," as provided in 3 U.S.C. §5 ....

That statute, in turn, requires

that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a conclusive
selection of electors be completed by December 12. That date is upon
us, and there is no recount procedure in place under the State Supreme
Court's order that comports with minimal constitutional standards.
Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December
12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have discussed, we
reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a
recount to proceed.
Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that
demand a remedy....

The only disagreement is as to the remedy.

Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida
Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. §5,
JUSTICE BREYER'S proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida
Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest
under December 18--contemplates action in violation of the Florida
Election Code, and hence could not be part of an "appropriate" order
authorized by Fla. Stat. Ann. § 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001).83
This reasoning is recited at length to show that the sole reason the
Court gave for ending the counting was based on its interpretation of
Florida law. However, no Florida statute stated or implied that the
counting had to be done by December 12. The sole authority for the
Supreme Court's conclusion was one statement by the Florida Supreme
Court.
However, that statement was made in a very different context and
when the Florida Supreme Court was not faced with the issue posed by
the Supreme Court's ruling. After the Supreme Court decided on
December 12 that the counting without standards violated equal
protection, the issue was what remedy was appropriate under Florida
law: continue the counting past December 12 or end the counting to
meet the December 12 deadline. The Supreme Court could not possibly
know how the Florida Supreme Court would resolve this issue because
it never had occurred before. Prior Florida decisions emphasized the
importance of making sure that every vote is accurately counted. 84 The
Florida Supreme Court might have relied on this to continue the

83. Id. at 110-11 (per curiam) (alteration in original).
84. See, e.g., State ex reL Millinor v. Smith, 144 So. 333, 335 (Fla. 1932) ("The right to a
correct count of the ballots in an election is a substantial right which it is the privilege of every
candidate for office to insist on, in every case where there has been a failure to make a proper

count ....).
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counting past December 12. Alternatively, the Florida Supreme Court
might have ended the counting, treating December 12 as a firm deadline
in Florida.
Indeed, after Bush v. Gore was decided, the Florida Supreme Court
issued a decision dismissing the case. 85 Justice Shaw, in a concurring
opinion, declared:
[I]n my opinion, December 12 was not a "drop-dead" date under
Florida law. In fact, I question whether any date prior to January 6 is
a drop-dead date under the Florida election scheme. December 12 was
simply a permissive "safe-harbor" date to which the states could
aspire. It certainly was not a mandatory contest deadline under the
plain language of the Florida Election Code .... 86
Perhaps a majority of the Florida Supreme Court would have
followed this view, perhaps not. The point is that this was a question of
Florida law to be decided by the Florida Supreme Court. Of course, it is
clearly established that state supreme courts get the final word as to the
interpretation of state law. In Murdock v. City of Memphis," in 1874,
the Supreme Court held that it could review only questions of federal
law, and that the decisions of the state's highest court are final on
questions of state law. 88 The Court explained that § 25 of the Judiciary
Act was based on a belief that the Supreme Court must be available to
ensure state compliance with the United States Constitution, but that
there was no indication that Congress intended
the Court to oversee
89
matters.
law
state
to
as
state court decisions
From a federalism perspective, it is inexplicable why the five Justices
in the majority-usually the advocates of states' rights on the Courtdid not remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court to decide under
Florida law whether the counting should continue. The Supreme Court
impermissibly usurped the Florida Supreme Court's authority to decide
Florida law in this extraordinary case.
CONCLUSION

Bush v. Gore is one of the most important Supreme Court decisions
in American history. It is the only instance in which the Supreme Court
decided the outcome of a presidential election. The decision will be,
and should be, analyzed as long as there is a United States. This essay
85. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd percuriam sub nom. Bush I1, 531
U.S. 98 (2000).
86. Id. at 528-29 (Shaw, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
87. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
88. Id. at 626.
89. Id. at 630.
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has attempted to suggest some fruitful, and some less useful, ways of
appraising the decision.

